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Abstract
This paper estimates VAR models to examine the response of monetary and fiscal
policy to macroeconomic targets, and the interdependence between the two policy
instruments. The models are estimated for a number of G7 countries. Our findings
show that, whilst monetary and fiscal policy are increasingly used as strategic
complements, the responsiveness of fiscal policy to the business cycle has
decreased since the 1980s. We also demonstrate that shifts in the strategic
interdependence between fiscal and monetary policy can be captured using
Bayesian VAR models.
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The advent of EMU has raised a number of issues regarding the relative
roles of ﬁscal and monetary policy. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP
henceforth) has imposed strict limits to countercyclical ﬁscal policies. Whilst
the SGP is seen as a tool to avoid excessive debt accumulation (see Beetsma
and Jensen, 1999; Beetsma and Uhlig, 1997), a number of authors (see
Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1998, for example) fear that the SGP will hamper
the operation of automatic stabilizers.
However, there is relatively scarce evidence on the interaction of ﬁscal
and monetary policies. Whilst considerable attention has been given to the
1way in which monetary authorities respond to macroeconomic conditions1,
much less empirical work has been done on ﬁscal policy2. Even less attention
has recently been paid to the interdependence between ﬁscal and monetary
policy at the empirical level.
The only notable exception are the studies by Mélitz (1997, 2000), Wyplosz
(1999) and von Hagen et al. (2001). For instance, using pooled data for a
number of OECD economies, Mélitz (1997) ﬁnds that ﬁscal and monetary
policy tend to move in opposite directions to each other3. In other words,
they are strategic substitutes. He also ﬁnds that a higher debt burden tends
to trigger an adjustment process.
The present paper extends this work in a number of directions. We
use VAR models (both conventional and Bayesian VARs) to characterise
ﬁscal-monetary interactions rather than estimate monetary and ﬁscal reac-
tion functions using single-equation methods. VAR studies of ﬁscal policy
are relatively scarce. This may be due to the standard criticism that a gov-
ernment change may determine the expectation of a ﬁscal policy shift well
before the new ﬁscal stance is detected in the VAR (see for example Mount-
ford and Uhlig, 2002). In our view, such a criticism is probably overstated.
In fact, one should bear in mind that the speciﬁc features of a policy pack-
age are crucial in determining agents’ reaction to ﬁscal legislation, whose
details often remain uncertain until the legislative process has been com-
pleted. Moreover, our results show that the ﬁscal shocks identiﬁed in the
VAR do have signiﬁcant eﬀects, while additional evidence discussed in Mus-
catelli, Tirelli and Trecroci (2002b) shows that ﬁscal and monetary shocks
play a similar role in explaining the forecast error variance of business cycle
ﬂuctuations. The evidence collected in the present paper sheds some light
on the dynamic adjustment of output, inﬂation and monetary policy. This
allows us to get a more complete picture of the dynamic interactions (in-
cluding regime shifts) between these jointly endogenous variables, and to
address a number of issues.
First, we examine whether the strategic substitutability result holds
for individual OECD countries. Our focus is on some of the major G7
economies, and we estimate VAR models with both ﬁscal and monetary
policy instruments to model the ﬁscal-monetary interactions. Our ﬁndings
show that the result of strategic substitutability does not hold uniformly for
all countries. Indeed, our results point to some interesting asymmetries in
the responses of ﬁscal and monetary policy. Moreover, our approach enables
us to examine the changes over time in the degree of strategic interaction
between ﬁscal and monetary policy, as the relationship between the policy
1See for example Clarida et al (1998, 2000), Muscatelli et al. (2000, 2002a), Favero
and Rovelli (1999).
2See Blanchard and Perotti (1999) and Fatas and Mihov (2000).
3Mèlitz uses a short term money market rate as the monetary instrument and the
primary surplus as a percentage of potential output as the ﬁscal instrument.
2instruments may not be constant over time. In a number of countries in our
sample the behaviour of monetary policy has changed markedly since the
early 1980s, with ﬁscal policy in Europe becoming increasingly constrained
by the process of nominal convergence. The SGP was the ﬁnal element in
this policy shift. Even in the USA, the debt-reduction measures of the 1990s
represent a sea change in the conduct of ﬁscal policy. We thus analyse the
extent to which the nature of ﬁscal-monetary interactions has changed by
reporting VAR estimates for the latter part of our sample, and by comput-
ing some Bayesian VAR estimates. These show that, in some countries, the
linkage between ﬁscal and monetary policy has shifted over time.
Second, we examine whether Mélitz’ result that a high degree of in-
debtedness triggers an adjustment in ﬁscal policy is robust for individual
countries, and whether it holds at all times. We ﬁnd no evidence of a deﬁcit
feedback on past debt levels,with the exception of Germany.
Third, by using our VAR model of the ﬁscal-monetary interactions, we
see whether, taking account of ﬁscal policy, we still get a plausible picture of
how a) monetary policy reacts to output and inﬂation shocks; b) output and
inﬂation react to interest rate shocks. As we shall see, our VAR models seem
to be broadly consistent with existing studies on monetary policy reaction
functions.
Fourth, we examine how ﬁscal policies react to output and inﬂation
shocks. Theoretical models are unambiguous about how ﬁscal stabilisation
policies operate. Is the empirical evidence consistent with the prescriptions
of these theoretical models?
Fifth, we examine how ﬁscal shocks are transmitted to the economy
and whether output and inﬂation react as expected. We show that some
diﬀerences emerge between countries, and that in some cases non-Keynesian
eﬀects tend to show up (see Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990, 1996).
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we survey
some of the existing literature on monetary-ﬁscal interactions, and outline
some of its key predictions. In Section 3 we outline our empirical method-
ology. In Section 4 we report and discuss our estimated models. Section 5
concludes.
2 Models of Fiscal-Monetary Interactions
The nature of the interdependence between ﬁscal and monetary policy is
a recurring theme in macroeconomics. The traditional analysis focuses on
the optimal policy mix when both policy instruments are under the control
of a single policymaker who aims at mutually inconsistent targets. In re-
cent years, following the widespread shift to a separation of powers between
ﬁscal authorities and independent central banks, theoretical research has
turned to the analysis of ﬁscal/monetary policy interactions when the two
3policymakers’ objectives diﬀer.
An important issue has been whether ﬁscal discretion should be regarded
as a threat to monetary policy commitment. The so-called Fiscal Theory
of Price Level Determination rests on the assumption that price stability is
unattainable unless intertemporal government solvency is guaranteed. This,
in turn, implies that a rise in inﬂationary pressures calls for both an interest
rate rise and the sterilisation of the ensuing higher debt-service payments.
Dixit and Lambertini (2000, 2001) explore the relation between ﬁscal dis-
cretion and monetary commitment in a model where the central bank has
only partial control over inﬂation, which is also directly aﬀected by the ﬁs-
cal policy stance4. Not surprisingly, these authors ﬁnd that in this case
ﬁscal discretion destroys monetary commitment. Dixit and Lambertini also
show that the tendency towards substitutability emerges when ﬁscal policy
tends to increase both output and inﬂation, whilst complementarity could
emerge where ﬁscal expansions have non-Keynesian (contractionary) eﬀects
on output and inﬂation.
An intriguing contribution by Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2000) suggests
that policy conﬂict may be endogenous to the choice of central bank pref-
erences: a strong bias in favour of price stability may induce the election of
ﬁscal policymakers who are more concerned about output.
Buti, Roeger and in’t Veld (2001) suggest that the speciﬁcf o r mo fi n -
terdependence between ﬁscal and monetary policies, i.e. the alternative
between strategic substitutability and complementarity, should not neces-
sarily be interpreted in terms of conﬂict or cooperation, and might be shock-
dependent. In their model the bank targets inﬂation and a nominal interest
rate objective, whereas the ﬁscal authority pursues output and deﬁcit tar-
gets. Supply shocks unambiguously induce conﬂicting policies, whereas the
opposite holds true for demand shocks.
Empirical evidence, uniformly based on panel data analysis, is scarce
and loosely related to the theoretical debate. Work by Mélitz (1997, 2000)
and Wyplosz (1999) broadly supports the view that the two policies tend to
move in opposite directions. By contrast, von Hagen, Hughes-Hallett and
Strauch (2001) ﬁnd that the interdependence between the two policymakers
is asymmetric: looser ﬁscal stances match monetary contractions, whereas
monetary policies broadly accommodate ﬁscal expansions. Finally, from the
early nineties these authors detect smaller ﬁscal responses to both monetary
shocks and cyclical conditions.
4Furthermore, conﬂicting objectives between the two policymakers, where the central
bank tries to achieve output and inﬂation levels below the ﬁscal authority’s targets, lead
to highly suboptimal Nash equilibria where monetary policy is too contractionary and the
ﬁscal stance is insuﬃciently expansionary.
43 Empirical Issues and the Econometric Method-
ology
Structural VAR techniques are now a customary tool in the study of mone-
tary policy. They provide a simple and powerful way to describe the dynamic
interactions between jointly endogenous variables. In fact, the lags associ-
ated with the formulation of budget policies, and those usually thought to
characterise the macroeconomic eﬀects of tax and spending decisions, make
the VAR framework in principle better suited to analyse the process of ﬁs-
cal transmission than in the case of monetary policy changes. VARs are
particularly attractive in the context of economic policy analysis5 because
of their ability to encompass the identiﬁcation of macroeconomic eﬀects of
policy decisions and the feedback reaction of policy authorities to the busi-
ness cycle in a relatively intuitive estimation strategy. Of course, one of the
strengths of VAR models (the limited need to rely on identifying restrictions)
is also one of its weaknesses. There is no attempt in just-identiﬁed VARs
to identify policymakers’ preferences or to estimate theory-based structural
reaction functions. In practice the policy reactions estimated in a VAR
model could be interpreted as reduced forms of forward-looking policy re-
action functions and structural parameters of the underlying economy. The
impulse responses would then be interpreted as responses to unanticipated
shocks to the economy. However, we would make two points in this re-
gard. First, in order to estimate structural reaction functions one has to
make some restrictive assumptions regarding the speciﬁcation of the policy
rules and impose (or assume) certain identifying restrictions. These mod-
elling assumptions are likely to be controversial, especially as far as ﬁscal
policy rules are concerned, as they are likely to be less robust and stable
over time. Second, whilst a VAR does not allow one to focus on individual
structural parameters of the policy reaction functions, it does nevertheless
allow a general picture to emerge regarding the policy reactions which oc-
curred, especially when the econometric evidence is backed up with reference
to well-known policy events or policy regime changes. The estimation of a
fully-ﬂedged structural model of ﬁscal and monetary reaction functions is
beyond the scope of this paper and will be considered in further work.
Indeed, as noted above, the use of VAR models to identify ﬁscal policy
shocks and the eﬀects of their transmission is still at a rather embryonic
stage6, whereas the interplay between ﬁscal and monetary policy decisions
and their macroeconomic eﬀects are yet to be tackled, to our knowledge, in
a dynamic, system-based approach.
In this paper we apply two complementary VAR methodologies to a set
5See Canova (1995) for a survey, and Bernanke and Mihov (1998) for an often-cited
application to the analysis of monetary policy.
6Blanchard and Perotti (1999), Edelberg, Eichenbaum and Fisher (1998), Fatas and
Mihov (2000) are amongst the early contributions to this approach.
5of quarterly variables for ﬁve OECD countries: Germany, France, Italy, the
United Kingdom, and the US. First, we estimate and analyse a conventional
structural VAR on a vector comprising the output gap (yt),t h ei n ﬂation
rate (πt),am e a s u r eo fﬁscal stance (gt) and the call money rate (rt).
The measure of ﬁscal stance is constructed as a deviation from a Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁltered trend (setting the HP factor at λ = 1600). Other studies
(see Melitz, 1997, 2000, Wyplosz, 1999) use the primary deﬁcit. Our choice
is motivated by the fact that primary deﬁcit data is only available at low fre-
quencies and would not allow us suﬃcient observations to estimate our VAR
models. It may be argued that, due to the contemporaneous eﬀect of interest
rate payments, total deﬁcit measures provide a somewhat blurred picture
of the ﬁscal policymaker’s true reactions to the business cycle. However, by
ﬁltering the deﬁcit series, we are removing the long-run trend component
in the deﬁcit, which is driven by debt interest dynamics. This way, our
FPI variable arguably captures short-run ﬁscal impulses and allows us to
analyse countercyclical ﬁscal policy7. On the other hand, we cannot iden-
tify the primary deﬁcit response to credibility shocks, which presumably
aﬀect the overall deﬁcit through debt service payments. Nevertheless, our
analysis of the ﬁscal response to inﬂation shocks does provide an indirect
test of the ﬁscal theory of price level determination (see the discussion in
the conclusions).
The optimal VAR order was selected according to results from the ap-
plication of conventional information criteria (AIC, HQ, SC) and formal
LR tests; the models we estimated were either VAR(2) or VAR(3). The
structural parameters were recovered through the imposition of a recursive,
Cholesky-type, decomposition of the residual covariance matrix. The vari-
able ordering chosen allows for contemporaneous eﬀects of all variables on
the monetary policy instrument, while the ﬁscal policy indicator is assumed
not to react to interest-rate shocks within the quarter. The longest estima-
tion sample starts from the early seventies for the European countries and
from the late ﬁfties for the US. Clearly, the use of such a long span in a
standard structural VAR approach has to take into account the possibility
of structural changes and regime shifts over the sample. This is why we
also illustrate estimates from sub-sample periods, in an attempt to capture
diﬀerences between the last two decades and the preceding years.
Next, we pursue the attempt to identify regime changes further, by com-
puting time-varying VAR estimates. Our approach follows the Bayesian
route pioneered by Doan, Litterman and Sims (1984), which allows the pa-
rameters of the estimated VAR and of the impulse response function to
evolve over time as more observations are added. This feature is particu-
larly useful in our case, as regime shifts that took place over the sample
7In current work we are extending our investigation to construct quarterly series on
the budget deﬁcit - see Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci (2002b).
6might have not only modiﬁed the parameters of the functions we are about
to study, but they might have done so in a gradual manner.
We now sketch the estimation procedure we followed. Let us start with
a standard VAR(p):
Xt = c +
p  
j=1
AjXt−j + εt (1)
where Xt is a n × 1 vector of endogenous variables, Ajsa r et h en × n
matrices of parameter coeﬃcients, and εt is a n × 1 vector of disturbances,
for which:










=0 ,∀t  = s
In what follows we use the same notation as in Lutkepohl (1991), and
Hamilton (1994)8. We thus re-write the model in the following way:
X = AZ + U;
X =
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Assuming time-varying coeﬃcients, equation j from the system in (1)
can be written as
xt,j = Z 

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
+ εt,j = Z βt + εt,j (3)
8See also Kim and Nelson (1999).
7where the βtsa r et h ee l e m e n t so ft h eV A Rc o e ﬃcients.
Doan et al. (1984) postulate a Bayesian prior distribution for the ﬁrst-
period value of the coeﬃcient vector: β11 ∼ N(β,P1|0). The procedure
we follow assumes that the VAR coeﬃcients follow an AR(1) process; the
transition equation of the system is therefore:
β1t =( 1− ψ1)β+ψ1β1t−1 + ξ1t (4)
In the above equation, the parameter vector follows a simple autoregres-
sive process, in which the weighting parameter ψ1 determines the importance
of the steady-state value for the coeﬃcient vector. The disturbance term is
uncorrelated with the disturbances in the original VAR: cov(ξ1t,ε1t)=0 ,
whereas the expected value β consists of a vector of zeroes with one as ele-
ments corresponding to the own variable at lag 1 (z1,t−1) for each equation.
This prior holds that changes in the endogenous variable modelled are so
diﬃcult to forecast that the coeﬃcient on its lagged value is likely to be
near unity, while all other coeﬃcients are assumed to be near zero. The
prior distribution is independent across coeﬃcients, so that the MSE of the
state vector is a diagonal matrix.
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
(7)
Q, the covariance matrix of ξ1t,i sg i v e nb y :Q =ψ2P1|0.
Doan et al. (1984) suggest the use of a predeﬁned set of values for the
above parameters. The following assumptions are made: γ2 =0 .07,w2 =
81/74,ϑ = 630,ψ1 =0 .999,ψ2 =1 0 −7. In addition,   τ2
i is the estimated vari-
ance of the residuals for a univariate AR(n) regression estimated for series
i. Note that the assumption is that the coeﬃcient vector β converges only
very slowly towards the mean. The factor γ deﬁnes the analyst’s conﬁdence
that the ﬁrst-order autoregressive coeﬃcients β1
ii relating zit to zit−1, is near
unity for all i; ϑ is set suﬃciently large to ensure that the prior expectation
that the constant term is zero is given little weight; w2 is set low to ensure
that lags of other variables zjt (j  = i) are less useful in forecasting zit than
own-lags. Doan et al. ﬁnd that these values work well for typical time series.
This general time-varying estimation problem is solved by forecasting in
each period the optimal state vector based on information available up to
the previous period. Under the normality and independence assumptions
about the disturbances, the computation of the state vector is simply ob-
tained by applying the Kalman ﬁlter (Harvey, 1989; Hamilton, 1994). This
allows us to obtain ﬁltered estimates of the VAR parameters and residual
variance-covariance matrix, for each observation in the sample. Orthogo-
nalised impulse responses are ﬁnally computed according to the standard
Cholesky decomposition, generating a set of diﬀerent impulse responses for
each observation of our sample.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Standard SVAR, Full Sample Estimates
The analysis carried out in this paper focuses on impulse response functions9.
Figures 1-5 show 95% conﬁdence bands for the impulse responses computed
from our structural VAR model estimated over the full sample. Turning ﬁrst
to the strategic complementarity/substitutability issue, we see that the form
of interdependence between the two instruments is asymmetric and diﬀers
across countries. In the US and the UK interest rates fall signiﬁcantly in
the ﬁrst quarter after the ﬁscal expansionary shock. In the cases of Italy,
Germany and France there seems to be no clear monetary reaction, although
in Germany there are some signs that monetary policy tends to oﬀset ﬁscal
policy shocks, as the impulse responses are nearly signiﬁcant.
In contrast, ﬁscal policy tends to be a strategic substitute for mone-
tary policy, with the exception of a temporary complementarity in the case
of Germany and the US after 1-2 quarters, subsequently reversed in the
medium run. In the case of the UK the ﬁscal policy response is not signiﬁ-
cant.
9The decomposition of the forecast error variance of output gap shocks conﬁrms, among
other things, that a large role is played by both ﬁscal and monetary policies. This result
and additional evidence as to the relative importance of economic policy innovations in
the stabilisation of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations are discussed in a companion paper (Mus-
catelli, Tirelli and Trecroci, 2002b).
9We turn next to how the policy instruments react to the output gap and
inﬂation. The monetary policy reactions to the inﬂation and output gap
shocks have the predicted signs. In all cases interest rates respond posi-
tively to the inﬂation and output gap shocks, although there is a diﬀerence
in the quantitative response, as one might expect from existing evidence
on monetary reaction functions (see Rudebusch and Svensson, 1999). In
general, the response is stronger in countries like the US and Germany10.
We ﬁnd evidence of the usual price puzzle immediately following an
interest rate shock11. By contrast, the interest rate shock triggers a fall in
the output gap. This evidence shows that the introduction of ﬁscal variables
does not yield markedly diﬀerent conclusions from the conventional VAR
analysis conducted in terms of monetary policy only.
Fiscal policy reacts as expected to output gap shocks: the deﬁcit falls
after a short lag. In the UK and the US the ﬁscal policy response is quan-
titatively larger than in France, Italy and Germany. The evidence on coun-
tercyclical responses to inﬂation is weaker and far less uniform (signiﬁcant
countercyclical responses are observed only in the US and France). This
mixed evidence on the response to inﬂation can be rationalised by assuming
that ﬁscal responses are mostly driven by automatic stabilisers, which are
triggered when output ﬂuctuates, and much less so in the face of inﬂation
shocks.
Fiscal shocks seem to have a standard expansionary impact on output
in the case of the USA, and to a lesser extent the UK (the impulse response
function is not signiﬁcant in the latter case). Negative (non-Keynesian) im-
pacts on the output gap are evident for other countries after 5-9 quarters,
although these eﬀects are not signiﬁcant. The only exception is Germany
at even longer horizons, where the impulse response function is almost sig-
niﬁcant at the 5% level. The impact of ﬁscal shocks on inﬂation, more
conventionally Keynesian, is only signiﬁcant in the case of Germany and, in
the longer run, of the US.
4.2 Robustness Checks: Identiﬁcation and Non-Linearities
Although our impulse responses were obtained with a Cholesky decompo-
sition, in fact the ordering seems to matter little to the results, which are
reasonably robust. In fact, we computed some generalised impulse responses
for the above VAR estimates (see Koop et al., 1996) and obtained very simi-
l a rr e s p o n s ed y n a m i c s .T h e s ei l l u s t r a t e that the residual variance-covariance
matrix is close to being diagonal, and orthogonalisation using a Cholesky
10It should be recalled that these are full-sample estimates, and therefore include the
somewhat more accommodating monetary policies implemented before 1980 (see Clarida
et al, 1998, 1999; Muscatelli et al. 2002).
11The price puzzle could be removed by introducing a commodity price index, but this
reduces our available sample considerably and aﬀects the signiﬁcance of our results.
10decomposition does not produce markedly diﬀerent results. In addition, we
estimated the VAR models imposing a diﬀerent ordering for the monetary
and ﬁscal policy instruments where the short-term interest rate comes be-
fore the budget deﬁcit - though both always follow output and inﬂation.
Our results were broadly conﬁrmed12. Hence in what follows we continue
to present and discuss results obtained using the Cholesky decompositions
with the ordering discussed in Section 3.
Another, more subtle point13, concerns the possibility that the contem-
poraneous response of the deﬁcit to a unit shock in the short-term interest
rates may be diﬀerent from zero, in contrast to what is assumed with a stan-
dard recursive triangularisation of the disturbance matrix. For instance, in
the case of Italy, where outstanding debt has generally been high and mainly
short term, one might expect any change in the level of interest rates to have
an immediate impact on debt service payments and hence on overall budget
deﬁcits. To check for this, we imposed several non-zero values for the con-
temporaneous reaction of Italian deﬁcits to a 1% shock to interest rates. As
shown in Figure 6, even assuming an 8% immediate increase in the budget
deﬁcit, the conclusions we have drawn in the former section remain broadly
unscathed. In detail, most impulse responses seem to gain some signiﬁcance,
without changing sign. Monetary policy responses to ﬁscal policy shocks ap-
pear almost signiﬁcant (with a 5 to 6-quarter lag) and pulling in the same
direction, whereas interest rates look slightly more eﬀective in stabilising
the cycle than before. The ﬁrst ﬁnding is more evident when the model is
estimated over the last two decades, whereas the second is more typically
found over the 1970s-1980s sample.
Finally, we tested for the possibility of non-linear behaviour by the mon-
etary and ﬁscal policy authorities. In particular, following Granger and
Terasvirta (1993) we ﬁtted the following models for the estimated residuals
  εt of each policy function:
  εt = γ 
0vt + γ 
1vtzt + γ 
2vt (zt)
2 + γ 
3vt (zt)
3 (8)
where vt is the vector of the variables (except the policy instrument at
hand) entering the original VAR models, and zt is a transition variable that
i sa s s u m e dt ob ei nt u r ne i t h e ro n eo ft h eo t h e rv a r i a b l e si nt h eV A Rm o d e l
(output gap, inﬂation, the other policy instrument) or the lagged value of the
instrument itself. The results of the tests for the Italian case, which prima
facie is the most likely to be characterised by non-linearities in the behaviour
of policy authorities, are displayed in Table 1 below. These ﬁndings do show
some signs of non-linear behaviour in the model, though the evidence is not
clear-cut. Note from Table 2 that the null hypothesis γ1 =0may be picking
up some heteroscedasticity due to multiplicative terms in the regressors. The
12The full results are available from the authors upon request.
13We thank G. De Arcangelis for raising this point.
11most relevant test of non-linear policy responses is γ1= γ2 =0 , which picks
up whether there is a policy response that depends in a non-linear way on
the transition variable. This hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level only for
the ﬁscal response, and even then the non-linearity is in terms of the lagged
budget deﬁcit, which suggests that the non-linearity is unlikely to aﬀect
any inference about the responses of ﬁscal policy to monetary shocks and
vice-versa.
Transition Variable Hypothesis Testing
Policies H0: γ1 =0 H0: γ1= γ2 =0
monetary zt = yt 1.2985 2.1442*
zt = πt 1.1656 1.9218*
zt = rt−1 0.6674 0.7605
zt = bdt 2.8207** 1.8046
ﬁscal zt = yt 0.4528 0.3139
zt = πt 1.3712 0.7273
zt = rt 2.4969* 1.6111
zt = bdt−1 1.3807 4.5129***
Table 1. Italy, Tests of Non-linear Policy Responses.
Notes. The test γ1= 0 is distributed as a F(3, 94) variate under H0;
the test γ1= γ2= 0 is instead distributed as a F(6, 94) variate under H0.
”***”, ”**”, and ”*” indicate that the null is rejected, respectively, at the
1%, 5%, and 10% signiﬁcance level.
Moreover, we should point out that these tests for non-linearity are very
general: they do not specify a precise form for the non-linear reaction under
the alternative hypothesis. In other words, even when non-linear eﬀects are
detected, no obvious operational conclusion can be drawn about the features
of the models we estimate. Given that the statistical test we implement has
power against diﬀerent kinds of non-linear models, and that its results do
not unambiguously point to non-linearity, this lends support to our view
that a linear model provides a useful characterisation of reality.
4.3 Sub-Sample Estimates
In this section we divide our full sample into two sub-periods, pre- and post—
1980. The choice of the sub-samples is suggested by the break in monetary
policy stance which was experienced by all these countries in the late 1970s
or early 1980s (see Clarida et al., 1998). Thus, for the US we consider a
break around 1979Q4, which is usually seen as the point after which the Fed
took a more decisive stance on inﬂation control. For the EU countries we
break the sample around 1980-1981, with the exception of Italy. In 1981-
1982 there were major reforms in Italy, separating the functions of the ﬁscal
and monetary authorities and the operations of the Bank of Italy. The
12breakpoint is therefore set at 1982Q4. In the case of France, and Italy, the
post-1983 period was then characterised by a gradual hardening of the ERM.
In the UK, the post-1981/82 period sees an end to the strict monetarist
experiment, and the adoption of a more eclectic monetary policy regime14.
We ﬁrst look again at the complementarity/substitutability issue. Table
2 summarises the results for the two sub-samples, fully presented in Figures
7 to 11. A (+) or (-) indicates respectively signiﬁcant evidence of comple-
mentarity or substitutability in the reaction of the ﬁscal or monetary policy
instrument to a shock in the other instrument15. A (0) indicates that there
is no signiﬁcant response detected from the impulse response function. A
double sign indicates a non-monotonic response; i.e. +/- shows that there
is complementarity after an initial lag, then followed by substitutability
Table 2: Complementarity/Substitutability in Fiscal and
Monetary Policy














There are a number of points to note from Table 2. There is strong
evidence that post-1980 monetary policy is used as a complement to ﬁscal
shocks, with the notable exception of Germany. In contrast, the evidence
on ﬁscal policy is ambiguous. In Germany post-1980 there is a reversal to
complementarity, whilst the opposite happened in the UK and France. In
the case of Italy, the insigniﬁcant result for the 1980s might be explained by
a ﬁscal strategy which was decoupled from the business cycle, both during
the apparently unstoppable ﬁscal expansion of the ’80s and during the sub-
sequent contraction in the 1990s. Our post-1980 estimates of the reaction
14Although further policy breaks were to follow - e.g. the UK’s entry to the ERM in
1990, its exit in 1992 (followed by the adoption of inﬂation targets), and the granting of
instrument independence to the Bank of England in 1997.
15Thus, for instance, the (-) in the case of the ﬁscal reaction to monetary policy in
France in the post-1980 results shows that FPI reacted with an expansion to an increase
in the interest rate (i.e. a monetary contraction).
13of ﬁscal policy to monetary policy correspond then to the results of Mélitz
(1997, 2000), and more closely to those of von Hagen et al16(2001), who ﬁnd
that ﬁscal policy has become less sensitive to the business cycle, in line with
the process of nominal convergence and the imposition of the Maastricht
criteria.
T u r n i n gt oF i g u r e s7 - 1 1w eﬁnd little evidence in favour of Dixit and
Lambertini (2000, 2001) argument that the relationship between the two
policy instruments depends on the sign of the ﬁscal impact on inﬂation
and output. In fact, ﬁscal policy does not appear to have a very signiﬁ-
cant impact on output and inﬂation. Even ignoring the signiﬁcance of the
impulse responses, we noted above that there is a tendency for more con-
ventional Keynesian eﬀects of ﬁscal policy in the UK and US and negative
impacts on output in the other countries (particularly Italy and Germany
post-1980). Whilst this might explain why monetary policy has become
more complementary to ﬁscal policy post-1980 in Italy and France, it is
diﬃcult to tationalise the pattern in the other countries. In our view, a
more consistent explanation is that a conventional Keynesian reaction to
the output cycle seems the main driving factor behind ﬁscal policies, with a
decreasing importance over time in Germany and Italy.
4.4 Debt Dynamics and Fiscal Policy
We have also experimented with extensions to our VAR analysis to include
debt adjustment. The purpose of this was to identify any feedback between
the deﬁcit and debt to GDP ratio17. We thus examined whether nominal
debt and nominal GDP were cointegrated for the countries in our sample.
Our results were generally disappointing. Cointegration was not found for
any of the countries with the exception of Germany, where there was some
evidence of feedback from the debt/GDP ratio to ﬁscal policy. To some ex-
tent this is not entirely surprising, as the sample period includes periods over
which the nominal debt/GDP ratio was trending in a number of countries,
and these countries were not targeting a particular value of the debt/GDP
ratio. These results are not reported here for reasons of space, but in further
work we intend to explore whether the feedback eﬀect can be detected over
sub-samples.
4.5 Bayesian VAR Estimates
In this section we reconsider the issue of policy shifts, i. e. changes in the
nature of the interdependence between the two policy instruments. Simple
16Recall that von Hagen et al. (2001) ﬁnd that whilst monetary contractions lead to
ﬁscal policy expansions, ﬁscal expansions are accommodated by monetary policy over the
sample period 1973-89.
17As discussed in the policy design context by Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) and detected
in empirical work by Melitz (1997).
14sub-sample estimates are a rough-and-ready indicator, whereas Bayesian
estimates allow us to get far deeper insights. In fact we ﬁnd that some of
the conclusions we reached in the former section must be at least qualiﬁed.
To illustrate how the Bayesian VAR analysis can capture shifts in the
VAR’s parameters, in Figure 12 we analyse the French ﬁscal policy response
to a shock in the output gap, showing four observations: 1985Q1, 1988Q1,
1990Q1 and 1996Q1. This exercise gives some intuition on how the working
of automatic stabilizers and discretionary ﬁscal policy has varied over time.
In 1985 and 1988 we detect an inverse response of the budget deﬁcit to
the output shock. However, since 1990 ﬁscal policy seems to have turned
pro-cyclical. Such a shift could not be detected in the post 1980 impulse
response functions depicted in Fig. 6.
For reasons of space, we focus only on some episodes where there ap-
pear to have been clear policy shifts in the relationship between ﬁscal and
monetary policy. Figures 13 to 16 show some of these episodes. In Fig-
ure 13 we show Bayesian VAR estimates for the response of ﬁscal policy
to a unit shock in the monetary instrument in France. Recall that Table
2 suggested that post-1983, French ﬁscal policy had acted as complement
to ﬁscal policy. Figure 13 conﬁrms this pattern, but provides a richer and
more detailed picture. From the graphs, it is apparent that monetary policy
was complement to ﬁscal policy in the 1980s, but became much less so post
1985, as the hard-ERM regime took hold. Indeed, there is clear-cut evidence
that since 1995 monetary policy has again become a strategic substitute for
ﬁscal policy. This evolution is conﬁrmed by the estimates for four individual
years: 1985, 1988, 1993 and 1997, which show the turning point.
Turning next to Italy, in Figure 14 we show the ﬁscal policy reaction to
monetary policy shocks. In Table 2 we had shown that this had become
insigniﬁcant post-1983. Again, we see that a richer picture emerges. Up
until the mid-1990s ﬁscal policy had reacted to interest rate increases with
an expansion, with a lag of 7-8 quarters (i.e. ﬁscal policy was a strategic
substitute, as reported in Table 2). However, we detect a gradual policy
change in the 1990s, i.e. the ﬁscal expansion becomes less and less signif-
icant, conﬁrming a conventional wisdom about what happened during the
transition to EMU.
Figure 15 shows some results concerning the reaction of monetary policy
to ﬁscal shocks in the UK. Post-1982 we had detected a strategic comple-
mentarity. However, the detailed impulse responses for 1981, 1985, 1992 and
1998 show that such a complementarity18 is only signiﬁcant in the 1990s.
Finally, Figure 16 shows some estimates for the US19. In the ’60s the
complementary response of monetary policy to a ﬁscal shock was barely
18Other Bayesian VAR estimates, not reported here for reasons of space, show that
ﬁscal policy has become more complementary to monetary policy in the 1990s.
19We also found that the ﬁscal responses to monetary policy were not signiﬁcant con-
ﬁrming the post-1980 results reported in Table 2.
15signiﬁcant. From the mid-1970s onwards, however, monetary policy appears
to complement ﬁscal policy, again conﬁrming our earlier results.
In the case of Germany, our Bayesian VAR estimates did not capture
any signiﬁcant shifts in policy, despite the shifts detected by dividing the
samples into two sub-samples in the VARs reported in Table 2. The most
likely explanation for this is that the major policy changes in Germany came
before or around 1980. Our Bayesian VAR estimates require a number
of observations to initialise the estimation, and signiﬁcant eﬀects can be
detected only after 1980. It appears that after this date little has changed
in German policy.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The empirical analysis of the interdependence between monetary and ﬁs-
cal policies, and of their interactions with key macroeconomic variables is a
largely unexplored ﬁeld. This happens despite the growing number of theo-
retical models that emphasize the role of ﬁscal rules in inﬂuencing monetary
policy conduct and aﬀecting business cycle ﬂuctuations. To some extent,
our ﬁndings are reassuring: the conventional wisdom on the transmission
of monetary policy, received from traditional SVAR models, survives to the
introduction of a ﬁscal policy variable. On the other hand, we ﬁnd that the
output eﬀects of ﬁscal shocks are ambiguous, that ﬁscal responses to inﬂa-
tion shocks are diﬃcult to detect, and that the nature of interdependence
between the two policy variables is highly unstable. None of these results is
easily reconciled with popular models designed to explain ﬁscal policy rules.
Moreover, our results indicate also that the ﬁscal deﬁcit does not react sig-
niﬁcantly to an inﬂationary shock. This in turn implies the absence of ﬁscal
dominance, as the ﬁscal authorities are willing to sterilise the increased debt
service from the monetary response to the inﬂation shock.
Future work should extend Bayesian VAR estimates to model the evolv-
ing features of the deﬁcit feedback onto past debt levels. It would also be
useful to characterise more precisely shifts in policy regimes, to identify the
fundamental driving forces behind the shifts in the interdependence between
ﬁscal and monetary policy. This would enable us to test Buti et al.’s (2001)
hypothesis that the nature of the interdependence between ﬁscal and mon-
etary policies depends on the nature of the shocks hitting the economy.
Finally, our models have focused on monetary and ﬁscal policy reactions
to unanticipated policy shocks. A natural extension to this paper is to
focus on quarterly measures of primary ﬁscal deﬁcits and the systematic
interactions between structural ﬁscal and monetary rules. This would allows
us to analyse the extent of monetary-ﬁscal complementarity-substitutability
in response to aggregate demand and supply shocks, which is the subject of
further work (see Muscatelli, Tirelli and Trecroci, 2002).
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19Data Appendix
The data employed were quarterly observations, seasonally adjusted where
available. The output gap is deﬁned as the (log) diﬀerence between ac-
tual and potential output. Inﬂation is the 4-quarter (log) diﬀerence in the
Consumer Price Index and, in the US case, in the GDP price index. The
monetary policy instrument considered was the Fed Funds Rate for the US,
and the respective call money rate for all other countries. The ﬁscal policy
indicator was the total budget deﬁcit, i.e., the diﬀerence between govern-
ment current expenditures (consumption + investment) and tax receipts. A
Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter (λ = 1600) was applied to the series to extract its
trend.
The following is a short description of all variables’ sources.
• United States. Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA tables. The data
can be downloaded from www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/AllTables.asp.
The output gap is calculated as the (log) diﬀerence between Real Gross
Domestic Product and Real Potential Gross Domestic Product, in Bil-
lions of Chained 1996 Dollars (source: U.S. Congress, Congressional
Budget Oﬃce). Inﬂation is the 4-quarter (log) diﬀerence in the Gross
Domestic Product Chain-type Price Index, 1996=100, Seasonally Ad-
justed (source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic
Analysis). The call money rate is the Federal Funds’ rate, obtained
from IMF’s IFS. The ﬁscal policy indicator was obtained from the sum
of Federal and State and Local current surplus or deﬁcit, Billions of
Dollars, Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate (source: National Income
and Product Accounts Tables, Tables 3.2 and 3.3).
• Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy (for output,
inﬂation and interest rate data). IMF’s International Financial
Statistics (Revenue, Expenditure and Lending minus Repayment, Call
Money Rate, Consumer Price Index and Gross Domestic Product);
OECD Statistical Compendium (Output Gap, semi-annual observa-
tions, linear interpolation was employed to construct the quarterly
series).
• Italy, budget series only: The series from IFS lacks a number of
observations around 1990. Consequently, a corresponding Bank of
Italy’s series was employed to integrate
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Graphs
The plots in the following pages are 95% confidence bands of the impulse responses from a just-
identified SVAR in the output gap (YGAP), inflation (INF), the deviations of the fiscal stance
from its H-P filtered trend (FPI), and the call money rate (CMR). Bootstrapping methods (500
simulations) were employed to determine 95% confidence bands around the orthogonalized
response (Choleski factorization of the varcov matrix was applied). INF → YGAP, for instance,
stands for impulse response of the output gap to a unit shock in the inflation rate.
Figure 1. Impulse responses, France 1973Q2-1998Q4.22
Figure 2. Impulse responses, Germany 1971Q1-1998Q4.
Figure 3. Impulse responses, Italy 1971Q4-1998Q4.23
Figure 4. Impulse responses, USA 1955Q1-1998Q4.
Figure 5. Impulse responses, United Kingdom 1972Q1-1998Q1.24
Figure 6. Impulse responses, Italy 1971Q4-1998Q4. It is assumed that a 1% change in interest
rates has a contemporaneous impact of 8% on the size of the budget deficit.25
Figure 7. Impulse responses, France: 1973Q2-1982Q2 (top panel) and 1980Q1-1998Q4 (bottom
panel).26
Figure 8. Impulse responses, Germany: 1971Q1-1982Q2 (top panel) and 1980Q1-1998Q4
(bottom panel).27
Figure 9. Impulse responses, Italy: 1971Q4-1982Q2 (top panel), and 1983Q1-1998Q4 (bottom
panel).28
Figure 10. Impulse Responses, United Kingdom: 1972Q1-1982Q2 (top panel), and 1980Q1-
1998Q1 (bottom panel).29
Figure 11. Impulse responses, United States: 1955Q1-1979Q4 (upper panel), and 1980Q1-
1998Q4 (lower panel).30
Figure 12. France 1973Q2-1998Q4. Bayesian VAR, impulse responses of the fiscal policy
indicator to a shock in the output gap, first quarters of various years.31
Figure 13. France 1973Q2-1998Q4. Bayesian VAR, impulse responses of the fiscal policy
indicator to a shock in the call money rate, first quarters of various years.32
Figure 14. Italy 1971Q4-1998Q4. Bayesian VAR, impulse responses of the fiscal policy
indicator to a shock in the call money rate, first quarters of various years.33
Figure 15. United Kingdom, 1972Q1-1998Q1. Bayesian VAR, impulse responses of the fiscal
policy indicator to a shock in the call money rate, first quarters of various years.34
Figure 16. USA, 1957Q1-1998Q4. Bayesian VAR, impulse responses of the fiscal policy
indicator to a shock in the call money rate, first quarters of various years.    CESifo Working Paper Series
(for full list see www.cesifo.de)
________________________________________________________________________
749  Hans Gersbach, Democratic Mechanisms: Double Majority Rules and Flexible Agenda
Costs, July 2002
750  Bruno S. Frey and Stephan Meier, Pro-Social Behavior, Reciprocity or Both?, July 2002
751  Jonas Agell and Helge Bennmarker, Wage Policy and Endogenous Wage Rigidity: A
Representative View From the Inside, July 2002
752  Edward Castronova, On Virtual Economies, July 2002
753  Rebecca M. Blank, U.S. Welfare Reform: What’s Relevant for Europe?, July 2002
754  Ruslan Lukach and Joseph Plasmans, Measuring Knowledge Spillovers Using Patent
Citations: Evidence from the Belgian Firm’s Data, July 2002
755  Aaron Tornell and Frank Westermann, Boom-Bust Cycles in Middle Income Countries:
Facts and Explanation, July 2002
756  Jan K. Brueckner, Internalization of Airport Congestion: A Network Analysis, July
2002
757  Lawrence M. Kahn, The Impact of Wage-Setting Institutions on the Incidence of Public
Employment in the OECD: 1960-98, July 2002
758  Sijbren Cnossen, Tax Policy in the European Union, August 2002
759  Chandima Mendis, External Shocks and Banking Crises in Developing Countries: Does
the Exchange Rate Regime Matter?, August 2002
760  Bruno S. Frey and Lars P. Feld, Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical
Analysis, August 2002
761  Lars Calmfors and Åsa Johansson, Nominal Wage Flexibility, Wage Indexation and
Monetary Union, August 2002
762  Alexander R. W. Robson and Stergios Skaperdas, Costly Enforcement of Property
Rights and the Coase Theorem, August 2002
763  Horst Raff, Preferential Trade Agreements and Tax Competition for Foreign Direct
Investment, August 2002
764  Alex Cukierman and V. Anton Muscatelli, Do Central Banks have Precautionary
Demands for Expansions and for Price Stability? – Theory and Evidence, August 2002
765  Giovanni Peri, Knowledge Flows and Knowledge Externalities, August 2002
766  Daniel Friedman and Nirvikar Singh, Equilibrium Vengeance, August 2002767  Sam Bucovetsky and Michael Smart, The Efficiency Consequences of Local Revenue
Equalization: Tax Competition and Tax Distortions, August 2002
768  Tapio Palokangas, International Labour Market Regulation and Economic Growth with
Creative Destruction, August 2002
769  Rudi Dornbusch, The New International Architecture, September 2002
770  Hans-Werner Sinn, Weber’s Law and the Biological Evolution of Risk Preferences: The
Selective Dominance of the Logarithmic Utility Function, September 2002
771  Thomas Mayer, The Macroeconomic Loss Function: A Critical Note, September 2002
772  Seppo Honkapohja and Kaushik Mitra, Learning Stability in Economies with
Heterogenous Agents, September 2002
773  David Laidler, Inflation Targets Versus International Monetary Integration – A
Canadian Perspective, September 2002
774  Morten I. Lau, Panu Poutvaara, and Andreas Wagener, The Dynamic Cost of the Draft,
September 2002
775  Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen, and Charles van Marrewijk, Locational Competition
and Agglomeration: The Role of Government Spending, September 2002
776  Anke S. Kessler and Christoph Lülfesmann, The Theory of Human Capital Revisited:
On the Interaction of General and Specific Investments, September 2002
777  Kjell Erik Lommerud, Frode Meland and Lars Sørgard, Unionized Oligopoly, Trade
Liberalization and Location Choice, September 2002
778  Antonio Merlo and François Ortalo-Magné, Bargaining over Residential Real Estate:
Evidence from England, September 2002
779  Yu-Fu Chen and Michael Funke, Exchange Rate Uncertainty and Labour Market
Adjustment under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates, September 2002
780  Michael S. Michael, International Migration, Income Taxes and Transfers: A Welfare
Analysis, September 2002
781  Clemens Fuest and Alfons Weichenrieder, Tax Competition and Profit Shifting: On the
Relationship between Personal and Corporate Tax Rates, October 2002
782  Jan Bouckaert and Hans Degryse, Softening Competition by Enhancing Entry: An
Example from the Banking Industry, October 2002
783  Johann K. Brunner and Susanne Pech, Adverse Selection in the Annuity Market with
Sequential and Simultaneous Insurance Demand, October 2002784  Gregory D. Hess and Eduard Pelz, The Economic Welfare Cost of Conflict: An
Empirical Assessment, October 2002
785  Jan Erik Askildsen, Uwe Jirjahn, and Stephen C. Smith, Works Councils and
Environmental Investment: Theory and Evidence from German Panel Data, October
2002
786  Geir H. Bjønnes, Dagfinn Rime, and Haakon O. Aa. Solheim, Volume and Volatility in
the FX-Market: Does it matter who you are?, October 2002
787  John Evans and John Fingleton, Entry Regulation and the Influence of an Incumbent
Special Interest Group, October 2002
788  Wolfgang Ochel, International Comparisons and Transfer of Labour Market
Institutions, October 2002
789  B. Gabriela Mundaca, Moral Hazard Effects of Bailing out under Asymmetric
Information, October 2002
790  Gene M. Grossman and Edwin L.-C. Lai, International Protection of Intellectual
Property, October 2002
791  John Hassler, José V. Rodriguez Mora, Kjetil Storesletten, and Fabrizio Zilibotti, A
Positive Theory of Geographic Mobility and Social Insurance, October 2002
792  Paul De Grauwe and Marianna Grimaldi, The Exchange Rate in a Model with
Heterogeneous Agents and Transactions Costs, October 2002
793  Guido Friebel and Mariassunta Giannetti, Fighting for Talent: Risk-shifting, Corporate
Volatility, and Organizational Change, October 2002
794  Jan Erik Askildsen, Badi H. Baltagi, and Tor Helge Holmås, Will Increased Wages
Reduce Shortage of Nurses? A Panel Data Analysis of Nurses’ Labour Supply, October
2002
795  Marko Köthenbürger and Panu Poutvaara, Social Security Reform and Intergenerational
Trade: Is there Scope for a Pareto-Improvement?, October 2002
796  Paul De Grauwe and Laura Rinaldi, A Model of the Card Payment System and the
Interchange Fee, October 2002
797  Volker Böhm and Tomoo Kikuchi, Dynamics of Endogenous Business Cycles and
Exchange Rate Volatility, October 2002
798  Mariam Camarero, Javier Ordóñez, and Cecilio Tamarit, The Euro-Dollar Exchange
Rate: Is it Fundamental?, October 2002
799  Misa Tanaka, How Do Bank Capital and Capital Adequacy Regulation Affect the
Monetary Transmission Mechanism?, October 2002800  Jörg Baten and Andrea Wagner, Autarchy, Market Disintegration, and Health: The
Mortality and Nutritional Crisis in Nazi Germany, 1933-1937, October 2002
801  Saku Aura, Uncommitted Couples: Some Efficiency and Policy Implications of Marital
Bargaining, October 2002
802  Wolfram F. Richter, Delaying Integration of Immigrant Labor for the Purpose of
Taxation, October 2002
803  Gil S. Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan, The Politics of Randomness, October 2002
804  John Hassler and José V. Rodriguez Mora, Should UI Benefits Really Fall over Time?,
October 2002
805  Friedrich Breyer and Stefan Felder, The Dead-anyway Effect Revis(it)ed, October 2002
806  Assar Lindbeck and Solveig Wikström, E-exchange and the Boundary between
Households and Organizations, November 2002
807  Dieter Bös, Contests Among Bureaucrats, November 2002
808  Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen, and Marc Schramm, The Strategic Bombing of
German Cities during World War II and its Impact on City Growth, November 2002
809  Florian Englmaier and Achim Wambach, Contracts and Inequity Aversion, November
2002
810  Sarbajit Sengupta, Delegating Recruitment under Asymmetric Information, December
2002
811  Rajshri Jayaraman, On the Partial Public Provision of a Private Good, December 2002
812  Stéphanie Stolz, Banking Supervision in Integrated Financial Markets: Implications for
the EU, December 2002
813  Christian Keuschnigg, Taxation of a Venture Capitalist with a Portfolio of Firms,
December 2002
814  Inés Macho-Stadler and David Pérez-Castrillo, Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution,
December 2002
815  Rainer Niemann and Dirk Simons, Costs, Benefits, and Tax-induced Distortions of
Stock Option Plans, December 2002
816  Jan-Egbert Sturm and Barry Williams, Deregulation, Entry of Foreign Banks and Bank
Efficiency in Australia, December 2002
817  V. Anton Muscatelli, Patrizio Tirelli, and Carmine Trecroci, Monetary and Fiscal Policy
Interactions over the Cycle: Some Empirical Evidence, December 2002